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ABSTRACT

REVISITING UNION DECLINE: AN ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZED LABOR’S
CRISIS, 1970-2008
FEBRUARY 2016

NATHAN MEYERS, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN DEARBORN

M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST

Directed by: Professor Donald Tomaskovic-Devey

I explore the sources of union decline from 1970-2008, inspecting the shifting
prominence of different causes at different points in time. Using a relational approach
which views labor and capital as actors that gain or lose power at the expense of each
other, I find that U.S. union decline is the result of several institutional transformations
that benefitted capital relative to labor. Capital was advantaged and labor was
disadvantaged due to: 1) the financialization of the economy in the 1980s, 2) weakening
protections of labor policy by the 1970s, 3) the reconfiguration of productive capital in
the 1970s and 1980s, 4) an anti-union business offensive gaining momentum in the
1970s, and 5) the failure of unions to sufficiently organize new members throughout the
entire period. Combined, this confluence of factors led to a steep decline in union
membership. Results highlight the complex nature of temporal dynamics in capital-labor
power struggles.
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CHAPTER 1
REVISITING UNION DECLINE
U.S. unions have been in crisis for the past 35 years. Beginning around 1980,
U.S. union density levels plummeted and many labor unions struggled to survive.
Organized labor had enjoyed a fairly secure existence for most of the previous half
century, but political and economic currents carved a new institutional landscape upon
which established bargaining patterns crumbled. The peak density level for private sector
union membership was 37% and occurred in 1953. Since then, private-sector
membership levels have dwindled to 6.6%. The public sector—which became heavily
unionized beginning in the 1960s—maintains membership levels of 35%2. Total union
membership, however, continued to increase through the 1970s before plummeting in the
early 1980s. By 2008, absolute union membership was only 49% of its peak 1979 levels.
Between 1979 and 1983 alone, organized labor lost 35.5% of its private-sector
membership, a large and drastic change to the national economy and the power of US
workers. Figure 1 shows trends in private-sector union membership in the productive
economy over time.

2

Statistics obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2015
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Figure 1: Private-Sector Unionization, 1970-2008
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The decline of unionism has been socially destructive. Union workers have
historically been paid significantly more than non-union workers (Freeman and Medoff
1984; Brady et al. 2013; Rosenfeld 2014), so the decline of unionization has been a major
contributor to increased inequality in the United States (Wallace et al. 1999; Western and
Rosenfeld 2011; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010a). Part of
this rising inequality, as union density has decreased, is exhibited by increasing rates of
poverty (Brady et al. 2013) and a shrinking middle class (Reich 2007). Unemployment
benefits have suffered as a result of waning union power (Gordon 2015). Perhaps most
importantly, unions are no longer able to shape pay standards for non-union workers
across the private economy (Rosenfeld 2014). Politically, the absence of labor unions has
meant lower voter turnout and political participation (Kerrissey and Schofer 2013). All
of these have been outcomes of organized labor’s declining bargaining power and the
waning effects of union benefits on the rest of the workforce.
2

Many potential causes of the decline of organized labor have been proposed.
Most authors have attributed the factors of union decline to single causes—or only
highlight one cause at the expense of others—such as the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB, Bronfenbrenner 2009), computerization (Kristal 2013), Ronald Reagan (Tope
and Jacobs 2009; Jacobs and Myers 2014), lack of labor militancy (Aronowitz 2014), the
political mobilization of the business community (Hacker and Pierson 2010a; Walker and
Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013), the failure of unions to organize (Mills 1948; Barkin 1961;
Fletcher and Gapasin 2008), or deindustrialization via increasing capital mobility
(Bluestone and Harrison 1982). Other scholars have listed various causes of decline, but
do not articulate how they occur as interdependent social processes that interact spatially
and temporally (Fiorito and Maranto 1987; Clawson and Clawson 1999; Freeman and
Medoff 1984; Goldfield 1987). Still, others have offered an internationalist perspective
that limits context for the sake of comparison (Western 1995, 1997; Misra and Hicks
1994). While each of these authors contributes something valuable, few explore how this
complex set of factors has interacted to form a broader social force (for exceptions in
other labor and work literature, see Dixon 2008; Haydu 1998; Tilly and Tilly 1998). In
this regard, faulting the individual studies is a misplaced critique; however, faulting the
field for undervaluing the complexity of social dynamics seems appropriate.
The nature of union strength rests on many foundations, which shift and affect
each other in a variety of ways. As this paper demonstrates, multiple factors have
interacted with each other to cause private-sector union density decline since 1953 and
membership decline since 1979, with a particularly sharp decline in the early 1980s that
drastically reduced the power of organized labor. Although a rich literature discusses
3

union decline, there are several gaps to be addressed, namely the failure to address how
different factors became more or less prominent over time, the relational aspects
associated with union decline, and a lack of strong theoretical analyses situating union
decline within a broader institutional framework. In short, a more complete analysis of
union decline is necessary to truly understand organized labor’s rise, fall, and potential
resurrection within the U.S. context.
Labor did not exert its power when it could have, while capital continually did.
Preserving power in relation to capital could have been a goal for the labor movement
decades before the crisis. However, due to legal barriers and a strategic focus on more
immediate concerns, most unions lacked the foresight to act accordingly. The sudden
shock of the 1980s drastically reduced the labor movement’s power to respond to present
or future challenges, suppressing unions by fundamentally changing their status relative
to employers. Changes usually occur slowly, so given its sudden loss of clout, the labor
movement has taken many years attempting to regain its composure and rebuild its lost
status in American society. Likewise, business and political interests increasingly
intensified their suppression of unionism as they gained power.
A relational and institutional approach is necessary for understanding union
decline. By this, I mean that the power of institutional actors can only be understood in
relation to one another. Many factors might be considered when reviewing the
fundamental challenges to U.S. unions, but discussion in this paper will be limited to
macro- and organizational-level processes that affected capital-labor relations. Five
institutional processes will be analyzed through an organizational lens; that is, with a
perspective that views institutional changes as products of the diffusion of behaviors and
4

processes at the organizational level. They are: 1) legislative policy drift by the 1970s, 2)
the reconfiguration of productive capital in the 1970s and 1980s, 3) a business
mobilization and offensive against unions gaining momentum in the 1970s, 4) the failure
of unions to adequately organize throughout the entire period, and 5) the financialization
of the economy beginning in the 1980s. The first four are the primary types of
explanations drawn from the existing literature, while financialization has yet to be
examined in depth. To support my argument, I examine private-sector, industry-year
dynamics from 1970-2008.
The five types of explanations are based on the different types of actors involved
in labor-capital relations. Legislative policy drift pertains to changes in the effects of
state policy over time. The reconfiguration of productive capital refers to systemic
changes to capital. The political mobilization and business offensive refers to employers’
strategies to intensify opposition to unionism both politically and in the workplace. The
failure of unions to organize enough workers encompasses organized labor’s role in the
crisis. Finally, financialization specifies the growth of finance in the economy.
Together, these explanations explain the relational nature of capital labor power
struggles.
By using industry-level panel data for year 1970-2008, I am able to employ
locally-weighted regression equations to examine temporal variation in each of my five
explanations. In doing so, the prominence of each explanation is examined in different
time periods. This enables complex social processes to be disentangled and a relational
theorization of capital-labor power struggles.

5

The Relational Approach to Inequality
Relational Inequality Theory (RIT, Avent-Holt and Tomaskovic-Devey 2014;
Tomaskovic-Devey 2014) provides a useful theoretical perspective for interpreting union
decline. In this framework, categorical distinctions—i.e. specific relational
classifications— between actors are necessary for understanding how actors interact.
When the manner in which organizational resources are generated or disbursed is
reshaped, existing patterns of resource allocation can be upset, allowing actors the
opportunity to engage in a process of claims making to gain access to new or existing
resources. Claims making is a central mechanism in this model, comprised of a two-step
process that involves: 1) an actor making claims on resources and 2) other actors
verifying or contesting the initial actor’s actors claim (Avent-Holt and TomaskovicDevey 2014). Of course, these actors must be in a position to stake claims in the first
place. Pertinent examples of claims making in this context might be labor unions
demanding higher wages from employers or employers refusing to bargain with unions.
These claims are not always direct contestations, as opponents can make claims by trying
to erode each other’s bases of power through legislative or other efforts rather than
directly confronting each other (Dixon 2008).
In the 1970s and 1980s, the reshaping of the U.S. economy enabled business to
stake claims on resources previously held by unions. This occurred through
concessionary demands and a general hostility towards acknowledging labor as a
legitimate organizational stakeholder. Employers actively sought to weaken unions by
reallocating capital and lobbying for deregulation, tactics that sought to weaken
institutionalized patterns of bargaining by operating outside of the traditional bargaining
6

framework. These efforts can be viewed as attempts of one organizational stakeholder to
lay claim to the resources currently held by another. In this case, organized labor and
capital make claims to assert their legitimate control over the workplace.
Institutional transformations shape the way contestations occur within
workplaces. While organizational settings are the points at which claims occur, they are
always nested in institutional contexts. Events that happen at specific workplaces can be
disseminated to other workplaces, creating an institutional phenomenon. At the same
time, national trends developed by the state, social movements, or the legitimation of
institutional phenomena can disseminate new practices across an organizational field
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The dispersion of these social changes affects the field of
contestation between capital and organized labor, the effects of which are visible at the
workplace/bargaining level. Capital and labor contest each other in an iterative manner-providing temporal dynamics— where the product of power and institutional forces at
one point in time is a function of how transformations occur at earlier points in time.
The workplace (i.e. the organizational level) is the ultimate point of contestation,
where all influences— global and local, political and economic, external and internal—
converge to influence outcomes of the struggle between workers and employers.
Institutional factors present themselves in workplace contestations, but are not
necessarily created within the workplaces where contestations occur. These factors
contribute to the effectiveness of business and labor union strategies by altering power
dynamics between capital and labor, directing— rather than determining— the outcomes
themselves. For example, deindustrialization has directly led to workplace closings and
job losses that have eliminated union jobs. Demographic changes in the overall size and
7

composition of the workforce have diluted areas with heavy union concentrations and
relocated employment away from these areas. The business offensive, signifying the end
of the so-called capital-labor accord of the postwar economy, occurred as employers
increased their anti-union tactics and coopted the National Labor Relations Board to
impede labor from organizing new workplaces.
Potential power can increase or decrease depending on institutional or
organizational settings, but must be mobilized or manipulated to become actuated
(Roscigno 2011). Even though decades of iterations in capital-labor contestations have
tended to favor capital, the increasing complexity of production processes have increased
capital-labor interdependence, which potentially increases the potential power of the
labor movement (Piven 2007). While this is yet to be realized, union decline and other
power processes should be considered ebbing and flowing rather than as a linear process
(Silver 2003; Polanyi 1944). With this general theoretical perspective in mind, I will
explore the major causes of union decline in the literature.
Explanation 1: Labor Policy
Federal labor law changed very little for private-sector workers in the several
decades preceding the 1980s. Despite this, the effect of established policies did change
as other changes to relational power transpired. Policy drift (Hacker and Pierson 2010a)
occurs when political actors use conscious inaction as a method of achieving their goals
as former policies become outdated, but remain in effect (also see Mills 1948 for an
earlier description of drift). In the case of the current industrial relations policy—as
governed by the National Labor Relations Acts—Kochan et al. (1986) described that
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employers ended the accord, no longer finding bargaining under the established system to
be in their best interests. While this might have been true, employers were assisted by the
conscious efforts of politicians (increasingly aided by corporate lobbyists) who
consciously failed to update NLRA as other institutional changes undermined the
foundations of legislation that once lent strength to organized labor.
Although not the first piece of labor relations to emerge from the Great
Depression-era, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, or the Wagner Act,
has been the foundation of U.S. labor relations policy since its inception. The earlier
National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 was ruled unconstitutional in May 1935, just
before the Wagner Act was passed in July of that year. NIRA was an effort to create
governmentalized business-labor cartels in efforts to promote mutual solidarity, but had
failed due to both the lack of union power at the time and opposition from many
conservatives who opposed the institutionalization of organized labor (Mills 1948).
Unlike its predecessor, the Wagner Act survived legal challenges, but has been weakened
over time.
Once passed, the Wagner Act guaranteed workers throughout most of the private
sector with the right to unionize free from employer interference and to collectively
bargain with employers over the conditions of their employment.3 A governmental
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) was established, placing the U.S. federal
government in a role as third-party mediator to capital-labor disputes, or as a third actor
in a relational conceptualization of labor relations. This third-party involvement by the
3

The earlier Norris-Laguardia Act of 1932 had already prevented employers from petitioning courts to file
injunctions restricting the tactics of organized labor (Getman and Pogrebin 1988).
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government enabled employees to file unfair labor practices against their employers,
while also providing an arbiter (NLRB) to ensure that employers bargained in good faith.
Following Wagner, union membership boomed.
Many anti-union politicians opposed NLRA provisions from their start, finding
the political opportunity to amend the legislation shortly after World War II. Overriding
President Truman’s veto, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of 1947 into
law, more commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. Provisions limiting labor tactics
included the reinstatement of court injunctions to limit strike activity; making secondary
boycotts4 unfair labor practices, a ban on wildcat strikes5, and a ban on sympathy strikes.
Anti-union legislation was enabled by granting states the ability to pass laws banning
union security agreements (these are known as Right-to-Work laws, but they enable
employees to opt out of paying union dues while retaining union benefits). Employers
were granted the ability to hold captive audience meetings and the “free speech” clause
enabling employers the ability to vocally oppose the union so long as they did not
interfere with unionization efforts. Union leaders became required to make anticommunist pledges to remain legally recognized. In 1959, Congress again amended the
NLRA through the Landrum-Griffin Act, which further restricted secondary boycotts and
required the disclosure of union financial documents.
Although the Taft-Hartley Act placed restrictions on union activities, many
workers— who opposed the law after union leaderships likened it to “slave labor”—
began to feel less strongly after several years passed without drastic consequences to their
4

Secondary boycotts are a type of labor tactic in which a secondary firm in a target company’s supply
chain is boycotted as a means of leveraging the target firm.
5
Wildcat strikes are strikes that occur without the support of union leadership, oftentimes unannounced.
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employment conditions (Lubell 1954). As one textile cutter belonging to the
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, who originally opposed the Taft-Hartley Act, claimed a
few years after the Act’s passage, “I’m for it now…There have been fewer strikes. When
other workers strike, business drops and we get laid off (1954:204-05).” As this cutter’s
experience illustrates, much of the damage done to unions by Taft-Hartley had originally
occurred in the form of limitations on tactics and organizing, rather than immediate
adverse effects on the everyday experiences of workers within those unions. After all,
growing union power seemed to continue growing at the outset of the law. These
limitations on union operations eventually affected workers in real, tangible ways, but the
immediate linkage to the effects of legislation was not immediately apparent.
There is no question as to whether Taft-Hartley constrained union organizing
efforts; in fact, it was designed to limit the economic pressures that unions could impose
on employers (Getman and Pogrebin 1988). However, its effects were both immediate
and long-ranging. Immediately, unions were limited in their tactics as secondary
boycotts and wildcat strikes became forbidden and employers’ regained the ability to
seek court injunctions limiting strike activities. Unions confronted the possibility of antiunion, Right-to-Work laws refocusing organizing efforts away from employers, towards
state politics and retaining individual dues payers within the union. Many leftists were
purged from unions due to the legislation’s anti-communist clause, making the labor
movement much more conservative. All of this mattered little as long as a capital-labor
accord was in place.
Unions seemingly thrived for decades after Taft-Hartley was enacted, despite
their politically-induced shift towards business-style unionism; albeit, with a steady,
11

gradual decline in union density after 1953. The sudden decline in union strength in the
1980s, I argue, is partly based on a temporal reemergence of the importance of the
limiting factors stemming from Taft-Hartley. Unions may have been restricted by the
law throughout the postwar era, but the institutional circumstances of collective
bargaining in the United States at that time had allowed unions to remain strong. When
other structural changes in the economy transformed the landscape upon which organized
labor contested employers, the restrictions of Taft-Hartley became a much larger burden
on unions. While other factors were also responsible for organized labor’s decline, the
collapse of established bargaining norms across many industries required unions to
engage in alternative tactics, but many possible options were illegal or limited. In effect,
organized labor had lost many tools from its repertoire at a time when many of them were
not vital to the survival of unionism; when new problems required usage of those old
tools, they were nowhere to be found in labor’s limited repertoire.
Though Taft-Hartley became more destructive in the 1980s than it was in the
1940s, Wagner also became less effective than it had been in previous years. Hacker and
Pierson’s (2010a) concept of policy drift is applicable to the evolution of the Wagner
Act—as the foundations of U.S. political economy shifted over time, a once effective
piece of legislation became outdated. After passage, Wagner had catalyzed a spectacular
growth in union membership, but years later, administrative appointments of an all probusiness National Labor Relations Board and the downfall of established bargaining
patterns had become new obstacles to union success (Kochan et al. 1986). For this
reason, a return to the Wagner version of NLRA would be necessary, but not sufficient,
for the labor movement to regain lost power.
12

Policy Drift Hypothesis: Union membership declined over time as existing labor law
became less supportive of unionism
Explanation 2: The Reconfiguration of Productive Capital
A reconfiguration of productive capital preceded the decline of union power in the
1980s. Comprising five primary moments, this reconfiguration included: 1) a
deindustrialization of regions containing unionized workforces and heavy industry, 2) the
rapid growth of the services sector, 3) a rise in global competition causing a reduction in
investments in domestic goods production, 4) the wide-scale automation of production,
and 5) an increased reliance on college-educated workers. Together, these factors may
have destabilized the capital-labor accord of the early postwar era.
Massive layoffs began as the 1970s experienced crisis and economic stagnation.
The postwar economic engine ceased to produce the prosperity that many businesses
came to expect. At the same time, new technologies enabled unprecedented levels of
capital mobility, allowing capital to flee to new industries and locations, particularly from
domestic heavy industry and the unionized Northeast and Midwestern states (Bluestone
and Harrison 1982; Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey 1983). Bluestone and Harrison (1982)
estimated that 38 million jobs were lost during the 1970s as businesses engaged in
practices of disinvestment and capital flight away from unions—a process characterized
by the reallocation of investments away from revenue sources, non-investment in the
maintenance of existing machinery, the physical relocation of capital equipment, and the
complete relocations of factories. At the same time, global competition increased as
foreign markets developed and U.S. capital chased new investment opportunities. This
whole process can be called deindustrialization.
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This considerable shift in the employment structure of the U.S. economy is also
reflected in changes to a more service-oriented economy (Miller and Tomaskovic-Devey
1983). Most job loss occurred in the manufacturing sector, as those jobs could be more
easily moved to regions of the country or world where labor was cheaper and unions
nonexistent (see Silver 2003), fostering the transition to a more service-oriented
economy as job growth concentrated mostly in the service sector. Likewise, continual
productivity gains in manufacturing meant fewer workers were necessary to perform the
same tasks. This process was further driven by new capitalist demands for the freer flow
of capital across international borders, thereby creating demands for more financial
malleability of international capital (Harvey 2005), which further enabled job destruction
and industrial reconfiguration in the U.S. as these demands bore fruition. Since union
strength had been strongest in the manufacturing sector and in the Northeast and
Midwest, the sudden onslaught of layoffs eliminated union jobs, directly reducing union
membership.
The spatial and sectoral reorganization of work within the U.S. might also explain
union decline. Many jobs were eliminated, but the total number of U.S jobs increased.
Western (1997) is critical of the idea that changes to the industrial structure have been
purely negative. He argues that a disaggregated analysis of unionization by industry is
necessary to make this argument. Rather than contributing to union decline, changes in
the industrial structure may have simply caused a shift in union strength towards some
industries and away from others. While density levels have fallen uniformly across
industries in the U.S., some of the effects of such a shift might be partially taken into
account by controlling for geographic region of employment (Goldfield 1987).
14

The geographic shift of industries from heavily-unionized states to low-union
Right-to-Work states may be a major example of the changing industrial structure,
leading to union decline (Rao et al. 2011; Hogler et al. 2004). Since employment growth
in RTW states is an indicator of deindustrialization and capital flight from states with
stronger labor laws, the geographic reconfiguration of employment demonstrates the
relational nature of workplace contestations. Employment in the United States did not
shrink, but its overall composition did change. Given the destruction of employment in
Northern manufacturing and the growth of employment in the RTW states, capital flight
may have been responsible for much of U.S. union decline.
Capital Flight Hypothesis: Capital flight away from states with strong labor laws caused
union decline.

Increasing global competition was likely a driver of union decline. Historically,
firms actively avoid unions by diverting investments when possible (Silver 2003). The
decentralization of global economic activity across the postwar era (Clawson and
Clawson 1999) was a likely result of employers fleeing heavily-unionized regions in
favor of cheaper labor. Increasing import penetration in the goods-producing sector
provides support for this argument, as this means that Americans increasingly consumed
foreign goods, leading to declining unionization as domestic production diminished.
Global Competition Hypothesis: An influx of global competition undermined union
employment

The size and physical organization of the workplace might also influence union
formation (Anner 2011), due to the disruptive capacity of employees whose work is time
15

sensitive or spatially isolated (Kimeldorf 2013). Silver (2003) discusses how technical
and organizational fixes enable employers to hinder union formation within a workplace.
For instance, as Silver notes, workers in a continuous-process automobile plant have
much more ability to shut down an entire facility with a strike than do workers in a textile
factory who each tend to their individual looms, simply because autos on a production
line must be assembled in a specific order and textiles do not require sequential
assemblage. Management is keenly aware of this and attempts to dilute this type of
power with technical and organizational fixes such as increased use of computers and
robotic equipment, segmentation of different departments into various puppet companies
within the same workplace, phantom employment practices (the absence of management,
common in janitorial work), and the flexibilization of employment through contracted
employment and the other precarious types of employment (Silver 2003; also see Batt
2001).
Another major way workplaces have been reorganized is through a process of
technological change, or automation, which has increased dramatically since the early
1970s. The increasing automation of production may have driven union decline (Reich
2007). Kristal (2013) argues that the computerization of the economy has been a primary
driver of union decline, resulting from factor-biased technological change (i.e.
computerization has benefitted capitalists more than workers) and class-biased
technological change (i.e. computerization has provided capital with increased ability to
suppress unionism) in which employers consciously automate workplaces to reduce
worker power. Rather than taking power into account, as Kristal does, the skill-biased
technological change (SBTC) literature assumes that technological advancement is a
16

natural process that weakened labor unions by providing highly-trained workers the
agency to bargain individually and reducing the bargaining leverage of lesser-trained
workers (Acemoglu et al. 2001; Autor 2003). Complementing Kristal's theoretical
perspective, Hanley (2014) claims that SBTC is undermined when a relational approach
is used to understand technological change, as occurs when employers use technological
advancement to stake claims on their managerial authority. Regardless of theoretical
perspective, previous literature has mostly viewed automation as a threat to the existence
of labor unions.
Technological Change Hypothesis: The automation of workplaces reduced union
membership, but the effect is greatest in the manufacturing sector

The changing economy has led to a higher demand for workers with college
educations. Mosher (2007) claims that the increasing college premium in the 1980s was
the result of union decline. Having a bachelor’s degree certainly provides many workers
the option to change jobs without starting from the bottom of a new career ladder, unlike
most blue collar jobs. This may lead some workers to believe that this type of leverage is
enough to allow them to bargain individually rather than collectively. Another possibility
is that college educated workers tend to have better working conditions and less cause for
grievance than other workers. While these possibilities cannot be examined here, the
rising employment of the college educated on union membership can be analyzed.
College Education Hypothesis: A rising proportion of the workforce with bachelor’s
degrees reduced union membership.
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As all of these broad changes to productive capital transformed the domestic
economy, power relations between labor and capital were fundamentally altered.
Capitalists benefitted from these transformations, likely driving union decline. Organized
labor became disempowered, leaving unions more vulnerable to the actions of employers.
Many capitalists took advantage of their renewed strength.
Explanation 3: Political Mobilization and the Business Offensive
During the 1970s, two major transformations to the behavior of capitalists
transpired. First, the business elite politically mobilized as an interest group. Second,
employers engaged in an anti-union business offensive, becoming more openly hostile to
the practice of collective bargaining. These two processes occurred in tandem, but the
business offensive required the advancement of political goals before becoming fully
successful.
Businesses mobilized to confront labor unions directly at firm and industrial
levels, but they also collectively organized to influence the national institutional
landscape. Earlier views on the business offensive focused largely on the role that
employers played in fighting union efforts, but a proliferation of literature on the business
mobilization has emerged in recent years (Mizruchi 2013; Walker and Rea 2014; Hacker
and Pierson 2010a, 2010b). Scholars have sought institutional explanations to account
for the disparities created by the political system, which have inevitably led to an
inspection of public policy and a resulting examination of how the decline of organized
labor’s power changed the political landscape in the 1980s.

18

The bases of political support for business interests must be recognized to
understand how their new political coalition was established. Responding to political
backlash from the social movements of the 1960s (Frank 2003), economic crisis in the
early 1970s (Mizruchi 2013; Bluestone and Harrison 1982), and uncertainty over the
future, some Americans sought to return to 1950s-era glory by confronting the imagined
moral decay sweeping over the country, robbing the U.S. of the greatness achieved
through hard work and sacrifice since World War II. Many labor-supporting Old Leftists
felt alienated by many of the New Left’s social justice causes that seemed divorced from
labor issues (Frank 2003). Republicans successfully split the New Deal coalition by
harnessing the resentment of Southern whites in years following the 1960s civil rights
legislation (Hacker and Pierson 2010b). The rise of the religious conservatism in
Republican politics catered to the moral decay arguments in the stagnant 1970s (2010b).
Following the turmoil of the 1960s an emergent radical right also appeared on the
political scene (Blee and Creasap 2010; Epstein and Forster 1967). Harnessing these
various cultural groups was essential for business interests seeking to gain influence as
the American political landscape reconfigured.
Business became mobilized as these processes took place. Shortly before his
nomination to the Supreme Court by the Nixon administration in 1971, then attorney and
chair of the Education Committee of the Chamber of Commerce Lewis Powell penned a
letter to the Chamber of Commerce calling for the business community to tap into its
unused organizational potential to combat what he perceived as an attack on the free
enterprise system. This included a call for the development of conservative responses to
liberal media, universities, and cultural products (Gross et al. 2013; Mizruchi 2013;
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Hacker and Pierson 2010b). Even if this memo echoed sentiments already present in the
business community, Powell’s call to arms and subsequent judicial appointment to the
U.S. Supreme Court were signifiers of an emerging activism within organized business
interests.
Though the goals of restoring American enterprise to its pre-Depression form are
wide-ranging, one primary aspect was the business community’s view that organized
labor was one of the primary impediments to this vision. The Business Roundtable
formed in 1972 as a collection of CEOs sought to advance the political interests of
American business (Walker and Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010a).
Mostly unstudied until recent years, the policy-drafting American Legislative Exchange
Council (ALEC) was formed in 1973 by conservatives seeking to change the political
tides in response to Left successes of the 1960s. Conservative think tanks mobilized to
develop intellectual alternatives to the messaging of organized labor and the New Left—
these included the already existing American Enterprise Institute (AEI) (Mizruchi 2013;
Medvetz 2006) and Hoover Institution, as well as newly funded think tanks such as the
Heritage Foundation founded in 1973 (Gross et al. 2013), the Cato Institute founded in
1977, and the Manhattan Institute founded in 1978 (Medvetz 2006). Other preexisting
business interest organizations actively opposing unions were the National Association of
Manufacturers, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce (Walker and Rea 2014; Mizruchi 2013; Hacker and Pierson
2010a). These organizations all played active roles in undermining the strength of the
labor movement throughout the 1970s.
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Mobilization within the business community meant that businesses played a more
active role in developing policy and influencing elections. Another significant way
capitalists mobilized was through the development of a conservative media organizations
(first print media, then radio in the 1980s, television in the 1990s, and web-based media
in the 21st century) and cultural alternatives that business-friendly politicians could use
as tools to promote or pursue their agendas (Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Other ways
might be through alternative knowledge-producing systems such as the think tanks
described above (Gross et al. 2013; Medvetz 2006).
The political mobilization of business in the 1970s produced the political space
for the simultaneously-occurring business offensive. While a product of broader political
forces, the business offensive clearly occurred at the workplace level. This includes
enhanced and increased union prevention tactics pursued by employers and attempts to
use the NLRB as a tool for preventing union certification elections, or enabling
decertification elections.

The business offensive had two primary components: 1) the

use of anti-union intimidation tactics on the part of employers and 2) the use of the
NLRB as a tool to actively thwart union efforts (see Bronfenbrenner 2009). The results
of NLRB elections are measurable and, ultimately, responsible for labor’s success in
organizing.
Employer opposition to unions has probably played a role in the decline in union
strength. Although many— if not most—employers never fully embraced the idea of
organized labor in their workplaces, employer opposition towards unions markedly
increased for two decades before the 1980s (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Clawson and
Clawson 1999; Fiorito and Maranto 1987). Clawson and Clawson (1999: 97) remark,
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“The vehemence of the employer mobilization suggests that the accord may never have
been as fully accepted by capital as many had supposed, that instead capital may simply
have recognized the strength of labor and concluded that certain kinds of opposition were
not [then] feasible.” Evidence of this is found in the attempts of management to break
the Steelworkers union during their prolonged strike in 1959 (Metzgar 2000) or the
efforts of eventual Phelps Dodge CEO Richard Moolick to bust unions in the 1950s and
1960s, decades before eventually working to bust the copper miners’ union after
becoming CEO of Phelps Dodge in 1982 (Rosenblum 1997). Others argue that this
accord existed, but was only pragmatic, a product of its own time, and by no means
universally accepted by management (Mills 1948; Kochan et al. 1986; Mizruchi 2013).
Regardless of how one views the existence of an accord, anti-union sentiment always
existed within the business community and the intensity of active employer opposition to
unions changed by the 1980s.
Freeman and Medoff’s (1984) landmark study, What Do Unions Do?, illustrates
how union success rates in NLRB elections had deteriorated beginning in the mid-1950s,
continuing into the late 1970s, when the private-sector success rate in NLRB elections
dropped below 25 percent. They also mention that employers contest nearly every NLRB
election, conduct anti-union campaigns, fire union activists, and bargain in bad faith over
contracts when unionization occurs. Beginning in the 1960s, employers’ use of illegal
tactics and disregard for labor law increased (1984). As Freeman and Medoff (1984:
233) claimed, “managerial opposition to unionism, and illegal campaign tactics in
particular, are a major, if not the major, determinant of NLRB election results.” Since this
study was published before the documented crash in union representation, it suggests that
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employer behavior changed prior to the 1980s as much as or more than NLRB behavior.
Although employers clearly disregarded the threat of unfair labor practice (ULP) rulings
as the business offensive began (Freeman 2011), the national increase in ULP claims
submitted against employers coincides with the intensification of employers’ animosity
towards organized labor.
Some work has sought to contextualize the historical origins leading to the
increasing hostility of employers and the increased prevalence of using NLRB elections
to prevent unionization (Bronfenbrenner 2009). Recent work has attributed the decline of
unions to the anti-union NLRB appointed by President Ronald Reagan (Tope and Jacobs
2009; to a lesser extent Jacobs and Myers 2014). Reagan appointed an all pro-business
board, but worth mentioning is that NLRBs of previous presidential administrations had
never been decidedly pro-labor (Barkin 1961). Some of this work also attributes
Reagan’s 1981 firing of over 11,000 air traffic controllers from PATCO—a public-sector
union whose employees were terminated by Reagan after conducting an illegal strike—
as a moment that emboldened employers to embrace an anti-union strategy (see McCartin
2011 for a history). These beliefs are common in the labor movement, but fail to
properly contextualize the broader structural changes taking place in the years prior to
Reagan’s election, such as the origins of economic financialization and several
deregulatory acts passed by Congress under the Carter administration (Miller and
Tomaskovic-Devey 1983), the political mobilization of business (Hacker and Pierson
2010a), as well as the increase in employer-contested NLRB elections and anti-union
tactics from management throughout the 1970s (Reich 2007; Freeman and Medoff 1984).
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Rather than going on the offensive as the result of administrative power or
charisma from the executive branch, others have attributed the business offensive to
changing economic conditions of the time. For instance, Kleiner (2001) points to
employers eventually realizing the perceived high benefits and low costs of suppressing
union activity. Kochan et al. (1986) explain that, after decades of stable bargaining
conditions under the guidelines set by the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (the
Wagner Act), management decided that it was no longer committed to bargaining
faithfully with unions, even as organized labor remained committed to the established,
yet outdated, practices (specifically collective bargaining methods), resulting in a gigantic
setback to the labor movement as unions struggled for survival during the business
offensive. Mizruchi (2013) describes this period of transition as a time where the
corporate elite collectively mobilized around a specific cause (i.e. to defeat organized
labor in the wake of the crisis, slump, and new regulations in the 1970s), achieved their
goal, and then fractured into narrow, self-interested pursuits. Some union decline may
have resulted from the business offensive that emerged from political-economic
transformations in the 1970s.
Business Offensive Hypothesis: Union decline was produced by an accelerating business
attack on labor in the 1970s, including both a resistance to new union formation and
established bargaining practices.

Explanation 4: Union Failure
Throughout most of the postwar period, unions failed to organize at an adequate
level to maintain vitality. The labor movement in the United States, through its postwar
embrace of business unionism—a version of unionism expressed through a narrow focus
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on economic benefits and a general disregard for social issues outside of one’s bargaining
sphere— became an amalgamation of unions that largely sought to protect and further
their own gains rather than devote resources to pursue a broader working-class
movement. Business unionism seemed to work well for the labor movement, especially
since union membership continued to expand. In practice, this was often a mechanism
for serving the short-term economic interests of a body of largely white, male unionists
while excluding others. However, workforce demographics changed over the second half
of the twentieth century. Two major demographic factors have negatively affected union
strength, continuing to present a challenge to unions today: 1) the number of people in the
workforce has grown dramatically since the end of World War II, presenting an
organizing challenge for unionists, and 2) the composition of the workforce has become
more feminized and less white, posing a challenge for many unions and workers who
have sought to protect—or, more accurately, regain—their status in the labor aristocracy.
This failure to embrace unionism as a working-class movement also harmed the labor
movement in the postwar years.
Union density is bound to shrink when the size of the workforce grows rapidly,
unless new workers and firms are organized into unions (Clawson and Clawson 1999;
Western 1997; Farber and Western 2001). This is simple math. Workforces that grow
quickly do not usually grow as rapidly in established areas of the economy; rather, they
grow in geographic or industrial areas that are new, innovative, or transformed places
(Silver 2003; also see Piketty 2014, Ch.2 for a discussion on the effects of demographic
growth on social change). These areas of the economy are generally not the places where
unionism is already established, so a post-industrial U.S. economy has come to require
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organizing in new industries. As Clawson and Clawson (1999) emphasize, the hesitance
of many established unions to include women and racial minorities despite the
progressive social movements of the 1960s and 1970s as well as the resulting influx of
these groups into the workforce, limited the ability of the labor movement to build
democratic unions with capacity to organize in a changing economy. Due to the fact that
capital always gains a foothold in the workplace before organized labor—and since that
creates a power differential from each workplace’s birth— unions faced an institutional
challenge organizing in an expanding economy, especially given their aversion to women
and minorities. So, the failure of unions to effectively maintain organizing efforts may
have contributed to organized labor’s decline (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Milkman
1985).
Union Organizing Hypothesis: The failure of unions to sufficiently organize new
workplaces in the postwar era contributed to union decline.

With the “male breadwinner” ideology regaining prominence after World War II
and remaining throughout the 1950s—and to some extent, never completely fading—
many Americans believed men should be the primary household wage earners while
women managed the domestic work (Coontz 2000). Many of the women whose
industrial fortitude of the 1940s inspired the creation of the Rosie the Riveter image
suddenly found that their liberation was temporary as traditional social norms reemerged.
The long-held cultural belief that women should tend families while men earned wages,
or that women should work jobs that only compliment men’s wages, reduced the social
value attributed to feminized labor, simultaneously reducing the perceived value of
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women in society (Glenn 2002). Even during the 1930s and 1940s, many unions kept
women on the periphery of the labor movement (Lasky 1985) or excluded them entirely
(Strom 1985). The changing nature of unions in the 1950s, coupled with highly gendersegregated workplaces, maintained gender inequalities within the labor movement. As
the occupational structure shifted from traditional union strongholds in manufacturing to
the more feminized service sector, the material conditions of the new economy came into
conflict with outdated cultural beliefs (Milkman 1985).
Some scholars have attributed women’s lower levels of union density to a
disinterest in being organized, usually because of their shorter job tenures and proclivities
for leaving the work force to have children (Bok and Dunlop 1970; Barkin 1961). This
view, although dated, overlooks the fact that workplaces have historically been shaped to
reinforce gender distinctions (Smith-Doerr 2004; Salzinger 2003), due to the efforts of
males working to protect their privileged economic status (Glenn 2002) and cultural
meanings of gender (Brenner 1998). However, women have actually demonstrated
stronger inclinations to support unions in their own workplaces (Milkman 1985; Freeman
and Medoff 1984) and have been closing the gap relative to men in total levels of
unionization since entering the workforce en masse post-1970 (Milkman 2007).
The norm in organizing efforts— even in organizing culture itself (Rooks
2003)—has been for men (usually white) to dominate unions, although there have been
efforts towards increasing gender equality. Much of the old labor iconography features
images glorifying masculine culture and the language is filled with metaphors related to
war or dominance (for example, see Kornbluh 1988). Even the joking relationships and
shop talk in male dominated industries include metaphors and allusions regarding the
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desirability of masculine characteristics and the undesirability of feminine traits (for
example, see Burawoy 1979; Halle 1984). Overall, the labor movement, similar to most
male-dominated institutions, has not traditionally welcomed women.
Female Exclusion Hypothesis: The growth of less gendered workplaces contributed to
union decline.

Many labor unions have also consciously excluded racial and ethnic minorities
from their ranks and leadership positions. Sometimes, such as in the case of the United
Auto Workers, the national or international leadership may promote inclusivity while its
locals work to maintain a racial hierarchy (Georgakas and Surkin 1975). Williams
(1987), in a 1976-1985 ethnographic study of black workers in suburban Chicago—
covering the time period in which union strength declined the most— found that even
after deindustrialization, white flight, and urban decay, black workers at one of the only
well-paying factories in town were regularly denied advancement opportunities afforded
to white workers, disparaged by management, and alienated from their unions. Royster
(2003) illustrates how young black students graduating from technical high schools are
often not mentored by teachers with the necessary network connections to land jobs in
skilled-trade jobs—jobs that likely would be unionized. Whether unionized, or seeking
stable working-class employment, racial minorities have historically been excluded from
unionized jobs and participation in organized labor.
Trade unionism emerged in the 19th century as a movement dominated by white
men (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008) and remained so as industrial unionism grew in the
20th century (Milkman 2007; Rooks 2003). Although trends have changed— and despite
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a few notable exceptions— contemporary unionism struggles with many of the same
problems of inclusivity. Fletcher and Gapasin (2008) stress the need for worker
education in organizing efforts as a way to overcome this challenge to building a stronger
labor movement. As the United Farmworkers illustrated in the 1960s (Ganz 2009; Shaw
2010), the Justice for Janitors campaign of the early 1990s (Milkman 2006; Waldinger et
al. 1998), and more recent campaigns have displayed, organizing around social-justice,
movement-oriented unionism is definitely possible.
Racial Exclusion Hypothesis: The growth in racially diverse workplaces contributed to
union decline.

Explanation 5: Financialization
In addition to the reorganization of productive capital, the rise of finance capital
has transformed the U.S. economy as well. A process of financialization began with
several deregulatory measures in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which played a pivotal
role in weakening the strength of the labor movement. National policy came to privilege
the liquidity of capital over production and employment stability as deregulation
proceeded, leading many non-finance firms to progressively prefer investments in
financial services over production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013), causing an
institutional reorganization which transferred power to finance-oriented capitalists.
Financial markets created new financial mechanisms, such as derivatives, that acted in
accordance with developing market logics (MacKenzie and Millo 2003). Institutional
analysis has revealed that debt holding became a highly profitable endeavor as interest
rates became more flexible, leading to an expansion of finance capital in non-finance
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firms following the Supreme Court’s Marquette decision in 1978 (Hyman 2012; also see
Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011). A removal of the restrictions on bank mergers
following the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980
allowed for a consolidation of the banking industry (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011)
shifting economic power into the hands of large corporate banks and away from the rest
of the economy. In the process, the finance industry vastly expanded its influence over
the economy through the expansion of credit and asset management (Greenwood and
Scharfstein 2013). Financialization is marked by the increasing reliance on finance by
non-finance firms as well as the predominance of banks over the non-finance economy
(Epstein and Jayadev 2005; Krippner 2005). The combined effects of financialization, as
investments in finance capital have encroached on productive investments, has been
associated with an overall decline in production in the U.S. economy (Stockhammer
2004; Tomaskovic-Devey et al. 2015).
Financialization has been deeply tied to the shareholder value movement, which
holds the benefit of stock owners as the primary concern of a company (Fligstein and
Shin 2007). This ended the “managerial revolution” described by economic historian
Alfred Chandler (1977), reconfiguring the dominant logic of U.S. capitalism from
production-oriented to finance-oriented. As Fligstein and Shin (2007) note, the
shareholder value movement was fundamentally at odds with organized labor, viewing
unions as costly inefficiencies from which profits could be freed. Since finance became
more profitable than production over the short run, one of the ways shareholders may
have sought to eliminate unions was through financial investment at the expense of
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production (Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013), thereby gaining the ability to circumvent
unions in times of labor unrest.
Financialization has been shown to negatively impact labor in other ways as well.
Lin (2013) finds that financialization is associated with declines in employment. Davis
(2014) finds that financialization has occurred at the expense of investment in production,
which explains why employment would decline as a result. Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey
(2013) speculate that productive labor has been devalued in the process (see Hanley 2014
for an example of this). However, some of what appears as financial investments in the
balance sheets of U.S. companies may simply be global investments in international
subsidiaries (Krippner 2011; Baud and Durand 2012), which also could undermine
organized labor via direct externalization of production.
Financialization Hypothesis: Both the increasing predominance of the finance industry
and the financialization of non-finance firms will negatively impact labor unions.

While financialization has had a notably negative impact on the U.S. economy,
scholars have not yet linked the process with union decline. Van Arnum and Naples
(2013) speculate that financialization may indirectly lead to de-unionization. To the best
of my knowledge, scholars have yet to test the effect of financialization on union
membership, although organizational inequality literature has served to highlight this
possible relationship.
Data
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I have offered five primary explanations for union decline. Within the arguments
for each lie hypotheses that parse different components or aspects of the explanations.
These hypotheses must now be operationalized into variables that can explain the
strength of each explanation at different moments in time. All explanations seem
plausible, but the task is now to parse their temporal effects apart. To do so, hypotheses
are examined using industry-level panel data for the years 1970-2008.
Variables have been collected from a variety of sources. The Current Population
Survey (CPS) and its CPS Integrated Public Use Micro-Series (IPUMS) are each sources
for demographic, geographic, and aggregated workplace data. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) provides National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data, which
includes information on industry earnings, investments, and assets. The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) Corporation Complete Reports provides my financialization measure.
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provides detailed information on the
outcomes of union certification elections and unfair labor practice (ULP) claims. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Structural Analysis
(STAN) database provides a measure for global competition. Details on data sources can
be found in Appendix A. See Table 1 for a description of variables.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Union Members (Ln)
Capital Flight (%)
Computerization (%)
Global Competition (%)
ULPs (negative ratio)
NLRB Union Loss %
Organizing Efforts (negative ratio)
% College Educated
% Some College
% Non-white Workers
% Female Workers
FIRE (%)
Productive Firm Financialization (%)

Obs
1270
1270
1270
768
1270
1270
1270
1270
1270
1270
1270
1270
1270

Mean
11.960
0.357
0.125
0.155
-0.374
0.514
-0.091
0.198
0.211
0.227
0.325
0.177
0.197

Std. Dev.
1.192
0.120
0.127
0.144
0.114
0.046
0.060
0.127
0.074
0.106
0.184
0.019
0.100

Min
8.349
0.053
0.000
0.000
-0.586
0.400
-0.199
0.000
0.016
0.001
0.000
0.147
0.034

Max
14.278
0.826
0.682
0.838
-0.178
0.597
-0.021
0.725
0.429
0.687
0.822
0.205
0.828

Suitable firm level employment data do not exist for the United States. Therefore,
an industry-level analysis is used as a proxy for the sites where production occurs (see
Kristal 2013; Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey 2013).

Industries included in the data

include all goods and services in the private, non-finance economy. In total, 44 industries
are in the dataset. Twenty-two industries span the entire time period. Ten industries are
only included for years 1970-1997. Twelve industries are only included for years 19982008. See Appendix B for a detailed description of industries.
One of the issues confronted by researchers using industry-level time-series data
stems from the classification of industries in national data records. Data for the period
1970-1997 uses the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, but data for all years
1998 and after use the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS). For
researchers, the problem with this switch is that industrial classifications became
reconfigured due to structural changes in the economy, meaning that many firms changed
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their industry groupings while some industries became aggregated or disaggregated. To
create a sense of continuity, industry groupings that remain mostly unchanged in the
1970-2008 period are combined to bridge the SIC-NAICS divide. Industry classifications
that do not appear in NAICS simply disappear from the data with the end of SIC in
1997.7
Declining union power is measured using the dependent variable union members.
It is a CPS measure of the natural log of total union employees per industry. Successes
and failures of unions at individual firms cannot be analyzed with this data. However,
within-industry unionization presented here demonstrates important structural level
trends in the U.S. economy. I chose union membership, rather than the conventional
union density. The reason for this choice lies in my conceptualization of power, which
relies on total organizational mobilization capacity rather than relative proportions. As
noted by nearly all previous scholars, there is a gradual decline across the period with a
steep drop-off in the early 1980s.
The Labor Policy explanation includes policy drift. Policy drift is tested using a
simple year measure.
The Reconfiguration of Productive Capital explanation is gauged by observing
data on global competition, levels of automation, and worker education levels. The
Capital Flight hypothesis is tested using Domestic Capital Flight, a measure of the spatial
relocation of work away from unionized areas and into developing areas of the economy.
Domestic Capital flight is an IPUMS measure of the percentage of U.S. workers within
7

This approach is somewhat conservative, as it only combines industries that can be directly replicated
across industry codes.
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each industry employed in Right-to-Work states.8 The global competition hypothesis is
tested using global competition, an OECD-STAN measure of import penetration9 in
extractive and transformative industries. Accounting for the technological change
hypothesis, I measure automation, which is a BEA-NIPA measure of computer
investment as a proportion of total investment in fixed assets. The college education
hypothesis is tested using college, an IPUMS measure of the percentage of workers in an
industry who have completed a bachelor’s degree.
The Business Offensive explanation uses National Labor Relations Board data on
national-level conflict between labor and capital. Both public- and private-sector
information is included, due to limitations in data collection capabilities. However, the
inclusion of data for the entire economy can serve as an indicator of the strength and the
organizing efforts of the labor movement. Union losses measures the proportion of union
certification elections lost by unions in relation the total number of elections held. This is
partially an indicator of the increased usage of anti-union tactics on the part of employers,
as the presence of these tactics has effectively lowered the chances that unions secure
election victory (Bronfenbrenner 2009). ULPs is a measure of unfair labor practice
claims made by workers at specific workplaces, with a negative coefficient to indicate
employer resistance rather than union success. Although there are many tactical reasons
for organized workers to file or abstain from filing ULP claims which can influence

8

For each respondent in IPUMS, the worker’s state is coded as either a RTW state or a non-RTW state.
CPS clustered several states into regions in years 1970-76, so fuzzy set coding was used to derive the
percentage of workers in RTW states. Fuzzy set estimates were obtained using Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) Current Employment Statistics state employment estimates for total employment by state. The data
can be found at http://www.bls.gov/sae/#tables.
9
Import penetration is a measure of foreign goods in an industry as a share of the gross domestic product
attributable to that particular industry.
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results as strategies shift, the total number of claims filed is an indicator of the intensity
of managerial opposition to unionism.
The union organizing hypothesis is tested using organizing efforts, a measurement
of the natural log total NLRB union certification elections per thousand employees, with
values flipped to negative to better capture organizing failure rather than the positive
benefits of organizing. This serves as an indicator of the effect of labor’s collective
failure to effectively organize as unions went into crisis. The racial exclusion hypothesis
is tested with non-white workers as a percentage of workers in an industry. The female
exclusion hypothesis is tested using female workers, an IPUMS measure of the
percentage of women in each industry.
The financialization hypothesis operates at both national and industry levels.
FIRE (finance, insurance, and real estate) is a national-level BEA-NIPA measure of the
percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product attributable to the financial sector, which is
conceptualized as an indicator of the growing power of the financial sector. Productive
firm financialization is an industry-level measure using IRS Corporate Complete Report
data of corporate financial assets as a proportion of total assets in private, non-finance
industries. This is conceptualized to capture a shift in firm investment strategy away
from production and towards financial strategies.

36

Methods
The analysis contains two stages. First, long-term effects of each factor on the
entire economy are examined, providing the net effects of union decline. Second,
locally-weighted regressions are used to estimate the dynamic effects of each variable as
their coefficients weaken or strengthen over time. This trend is weighted exponentially by
a factor of 0.810 for each year of distance from the current year so that the effects of any
particular year diminish across each subsequent year, allowing trends to be plotted for
specific points in time when the effects of each variable change. As a new approach for
determining temporal causality, my usage of locally-weighted regressions is a powerful
tool for parsing complex social processes by paying more attention to when a causal
impact happens than simply to statistical significance across the entire period.
My main models address the various explanations of union decline with
temporally-weighted single-equation error correction models (ECMs, see Beck 1991; De
Boef and Keele 2008). The analytical advantage of ECMs is that they allow researchers
to estimate the long-run, cumulative effect of the explanatory variable. I use temporal
weighting to identify particular moments in time where effects are stronger and weaker.
To absorb the interferences of industrial trends, fixed effect terms are included for
industry in the models.11 This ensures that the estimates are derived from within industry
10

When using locally-weighted regressions, a researcher must choose a factor that best fits their analysis.
A factor of 1 would yield the same results for each year. Numbers closer to one are better at measuring
long-term stability, while numbers closer to 0 are better at measuring shocks. After some testing, a factor
of 0.8 was chosen as a compromise between the two. The calculations used in these models are more
conservative than the cumulative effects in APPENDIX C so the results are not directly comparable. For
this analysis, locally-weighted regressions are useful for disaggregating the time and sector-specific effects.
11
The main interest of this study is to analyze the net effects of specific processes on the broader structure
of the economy, but an analysis of particular industries might yield results that vary.
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variance in the rate of change instead of unobserved between-industry differences.
Standard errors are clustered by industry.
The models are specified as:
∆Yi,t = α0 + α1,i − β1 Yi,t−1 + β2 Xi,t−1 + β3 ∆Xi,t + εi,t

where ΔYt denotes the first difference Yt - Yt-1, α0 denotes the grand mean, α1,i denotes
industry-specific deviation in change, β1 denotes the adjustment or error correction rate of
Y, and β2 denotes that the direct effect of Xt-1 on ΔYt. β3∆Xi,t is treated as a control for
short run investment allocations. Conditional on other covariates, a unit increase in Yt-1
leads to β1 unit decrease in ΔYt and therefore 1- β1 unit increase in Yt. Furthermore,
because the dataset is unbalanced (the NAICS data has more industrial categories), the
importance across years is equalized by assigning a year-specific inverse probability
weight to each observation:
𝑊𝑖,𝑡 = 1⁄𝑁𝑡
where W denotes the weight of observation i, and N denotes the total employment in year
t.
The first year every industry appears in the data drops from the equation due to
the lag structure of the ECMs. This occurs in either 1970 or 1998, depending on the
SIC/NAICS code. For this reason, the number of observations in the output does not
match those of the descriptive statistics in Table 1.
ECM models estimate both an instantaneous and long run effect for all covariates.
A conservative approach is employed here, focusing on the long-run effects in the
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analysis. Interpreting the contemporaneous coefficient as an instantaneous effect is only
appropriate when the causal direction is firmly established and might be less appropriate
in a longer time series as temporal dynamics begin to emerge. The interpretation of the
long-run effect, by contrast, does not require an implausible causal assumption and is
consistent with the theoretical argument that long-term union decline has fundamentally
altered capital-labor relations. To compute the long-run effect, β2 is divided by the error
correction rate β1 .

Three of the five national-level trend variables cannot be entered into the same
model due to multi-collinearity.12 For this reason, my analysis uses four parallel
explanatory models, each with different national-level independent variables. All
industry-level variables remain the same in each model. Model 1, the “FIRE” model,
examines the effects of the increasing predominance of FIRE in the U.S. economy.
Model 2, the “Union Failure” model, tests whether or not decreasing union organizing
efforts caused union decline. Model 3, the “Year” model, includes a control for year to
estimate the extent to which effects captured through the simple progression of time, such
as legislative policy drift, caused union decline. Together, these models will collectively
test whether the Reagan presidential administration played a unique role in creating a
crisis for organized labor (Tope and Jacobs 2009). While some national trends are not
statistically tested in the same models, a side-by-side comparison of trends can highlight
similarities and differences in each of these three models.

12

Collinearity tests were conducted to determine the suitability of covariates in models.
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Results
Results are organized by the five union decline explanations. Each is displayed
below by model. Results are somewhat similar across the three national time trend
models. See differences in the measured effects of FIRE, Union Failure to Organize, and
Year variables to interpret any differences between models. Subsequent figures combine
models by variable. Figures can be interpreted by viewing the trend each year in relation
to zero. Anytime the confidence intervals for each coefficient do not overlap the y-axis
of the graph, the effect for that particular year is significant. Only long-term effects for
specific years are captured in this type of analysis. The profound strength of the
temporal-weighted analysis is the ability to untangle the temporal dynamics of historical
processes. Most time series analyses treat causal effects as if they are constant over time.
This is almost always an unrealistic assumption. In the literature on union decline
reviewed above there is a strong historical argument not only about what, but also when
factors began to influence union decline. Aggregated long-term effects for the entire
period are included in Appendix C.
First, I examine the labor policy in Explanation 1. Effects captured in the Year
variable, presented in Figure 2, are consistently negative throughout the entire time
period. This is important for several reasons. The year effect captures aspects of policy
drift that are not modeled elsewhere. Although FIRE, Union Organizing, and the
political mobilization of capitalists may be captured in this effect, this outcome
nonetheless lends credence to the Policy Drift Hypothesis, which already receives
qualitative support. Given that effects are present and strongest in the 1970s, evidence
also suggests that the Reagan administration’s policies and changes to the NLRB in the
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1980s were not as uniquely influential to union decline as has previously been suggested
(Tope and Jacobs 2009).
Figure 2: Year-Specific Effects on Union Membership

Explanation 2, on the reconfiguration of productive capital, examines structural
changes to the political economic and industrial structures. Contrary to the Capital Flight
Hypothesis, the increase in employment in Right-to-Work states was not a primary driver
of union decline (see Figure 3). The shifting patterns of employment away from states
with stronger labor laws actually boosted union membership as unions declined in the
early 1980s. This is consistent with Western’s (1997) argument that changes to the
industrial structure merely shifted union strength. However, RTW laws probably still
have a suppressant effect on the capacity of workers to exercise power.
Figure 3: Effects of Domestic Capital Flight on Union Membership

This counterintuitive result requires more explanation. Upon further inspection
(Appendix D), the addition of a sectoral interaction to the models produced a negative
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effect on union membership in the E&T sector. That is, the positive result for capital
flight can only be explained by the expansion of employment in the service sector. The
effects of capital flight to states with weak labor laws, then, must consider the sectoral
transformation in U.S. employment. As employment in the extractive and transformative
sector declined, the growth of the service sector provided new opportunities for
unionization, even if conditions were not conducive to a thriving labor movement. At the
same time, jobs in goods-producing industries were likely to be completely eliminated
through offshoring or remain non-unionized after outsourcing.
Increased global competition has consistently reduced union membership in the
E&T sector (see Figure 4). Important to note here is that the Global Competition
measure only contains goods-producing industries, so graphs in this figure are not tested
in the same analysis as other figures displayed. If global competition were to be factored
into the rest of the results section, observations from the service sector would be
eliminated from the analysis. Therefore, I have chosen to exclude results from the other
variables included in the models with Global Competition.

Figure 4: Effects of Global Competition on Union Membership
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The effect of global competition actually became stronger over time, even as there
is less union membership to be lost. Consistent with Beverly Silver’s (2003) argument,
capital seems to flee union dense geographic locations to less unionized locales whenever
possible. This means that some types of work have been directly transported out of the
United States, becoming direct competition for American workers. Simultaneously, and
perhaps equally important, other countries became more economically competitive with
the United States throughout the postwar years, a process that still continues. While
difficult to trace, part of this increased competition might be the result of the
financialization of investment portfolios of U.S. firms as they invest in foreign
subsidiaries (Krippner 2011; Baud and Durand 2012). The Global Competition
Hypothesis is supported.
The automation of the U.S. economy is presented in Figure 5. As displayed,
results reveal that the effects of automation are not stationary. Investment in computer
technology positively affected union membership until the mid-1990s. At this point,
increased computer investment became a driver for union decline for the remainder of the
time studied.
Figure 5: Effects of Automation on Union Membership
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Automation may have originally represented an increase in fixed assets, which
represented an investment in production in a particular locality. In later years, negative
effects may have been caused by further advancements in computer technology and the
growth of employment in the less capital-intensive service sector. Inter-industry
variation of these effects likely exists, especially since some jobs may be supplemented
and other jobs replaced by computer technology (Autor 2003; Kristal 2013).
For most years, union decline is not significantly related to the growth of college
educated labor forces. However, an increasingly college-educated workforce negatively
impacted unions beginning in the early- to mid-1980s into the mid-1990s and after 2003
(see Figure 6). That is, increases in college-educated workers were subsequently
followed by loss of union membership net of other factors. Mosher (2007) finds that
union decline precipitated growth in the college premium on workers’ wages in the
1980s. This analysis reveals that, when any effect existed, an increase in collegeeducated workers preceded shrinking union membership. That is, rising college premium
might have driven union decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Figure 6: Effects of College Education on Union Membership

Explanation 3 includes the business offensive, which analyzes the behavior of
employers. The effects of ULPs negatively impacted union membership at several points
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in time, most notably in the time period before 1980 (Figure 7). Employers increasingly
embraced illegal tactics throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Bronfenbrenner 2009; Freeman
and Medoff 1984), so the negative effects of ULPs on membership before declines in the
1980s are not surprising. This does provide further empirical evidence that the business
community was not emboldened or enabled by the Reagan administration, which did not
take office until 1981. Worth mentioning here is that ULPs are initiated strategically by
unions, so the initial impact of the business offensive might best be captured here.
Figure 7: Effects of Unfair Labor Practices on Union Membership

Union losses in NLRB elections only seem to have driven union decline in the
late 1980s (Figure 8). However, the negative effect is not present when union organizing
efforts are taken into account. This may happen because the lack of union organizing
was more impactful than anti-union campaigns organized by management. Prior research
has already indicated that unions are more likely to win when they devote more resources
to organizing (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998), so one may plausibly conclude that
labor unions misallocated their resources by becoming more defensive in their efforts. In
models measuring long-term effects for the entire period (Appendix C), rather than these
year-specific models, union losses have a consistent negative effect on union
membership.
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Figure 8: Effects of Union Losses in NLRB Elections on Union Membership

Given the results of ULPs and union losses, the Business Offensive Hypothesis is
supported. Figures for these two variables indicate that the effect of illegal employer
tactics was already harming unions in the 1970s, before employers developed more
sophisticated techniques for fighting unionization.
Union Failure is captured in Explanation 4, including the lack of organizing
efforts and labor movement exclusion. Union Failure to Organize consistently led to
declines in union membership in every year of the analysis, supporting the Union
Organizing Hypothesis (Figure 9). Consistent with the findings of Bronfenbrenner and
Juravich (1998), unions must organize if they are to win. Whether or not this has always
been possible is debatable. The inadequacy of union organizing efforts may have
stemmed from the purging of labor radicalism in the 1950s, the inability to predict the
business offensive during an economic boom period, or possibly the organizational
inertia caused by the bureaucratization of the labor movement. However, as some of the
short-term survival techniques that unions used as the business offensive began were not
effective in the long-term.
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Figure 9: Effects of Union Failure to Organize on Union Membership

Women may have been historically excluded from many aspects of labor
movement participation, but this analysis illustrates that this exclusion did not contribute
to decline in the post-1970 era (See Figure 10). By some time in the 1980s or 1990s, the
net effect of an increasingly female workforce was positive for labor unions. This effect
became increasingly stronger throughout the 2000s. As old practices of female exclusion
slowly yielded to new economic conditions (Milkman 1985; 2007), increasing labor
movement access to feminized industries has buffered the unions from further decline.
While sex-based exclusion is still likely a factor in the labor movement, I find no
evidence supporting the Female Exclusion Hypothesis.
Figure 10: Effects of Feminization of the Workforce on Union Membership

Racial exclusion had no measurable effect on union decline in locally-weighted
regression models (Figure 11). Even though racial exclusion has occurred within the
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labor movement (Fletcher and Gapasin 2008), effects did not cause union decline at any
particular time in this analysis.
Figure 11: Effects of Racial Diversification of the Workforce on Union Membership

Explantion 5 considers the financialization of the U.S. economy. Financialization
has resulted in lower union membership. The first component of the financialization
hypothesis, illustrated in the Figure 12, presents the negative effects of an increasingly
predominant finance sector on union membership, which persist throughout the entire
period studied. As the FIRE sector grew as a proportion of U.S. gross domestic product,
its ability to extract rents increased (Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin 2011) through expanded
financial investments in the productive economy. Tomaskovic-Devey, Lin, and Meyers
(2015) find that financialization increased interest paid to creditors, indicating that
economic rents from the productive economy might be paid to FIRE. With this type of
leverage, and knowing that bankers have played pivotal roles in anti-union business
groups such as the Business Roundtable (Mizruchi 2013), the connection between a
growing financial sector and union decline seems more intuitive. The rise of the
shareholder value movement (Fligstein and Shin 2007, coupled with FIRE’s unique
power over the economy, explain negative impact of FIRE on union membership. The
effects of a financializing economy were strongest earlier in the period, although they are
always significantly negative.
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Figure 12: Effects of the Growth of FIRE (Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) on
Union Membership

In contrast, the financialization of productive firms began to drive union decline
only after 1980 (Figure 13). After financial deregulations relaxed restrictions on credit in
1978 and enabled banking industry mergers in 1980, firms gained the ability to generate
income through investments in finance rather than production. With labor marginalized
in the revenue generation process (Lin 2013), unions lost a strategic point of leverage in
the bargaining process as their ability to threaten company revenue sources diminished.
A financialized company can more easily outlast workers engaging in a traditional strike,
which is why increased worker militancy (Aronowitz 2014) is not sufficient for unions
contesting capital in the new economy. A deep recession in 1981-1982 could have
served as a catalyst for firms to invest in finance instead of production, especially as high
interest rates pressured firms to focus on short-term profitability.
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Figure 13: Effects of the Financialization of Productive Firms on Union
Membership

These results indicate that an adequate explanation of union decline should
include explanations of: 1) labor policy and the effects of policy drift, 2) the
reconfiguration of productive capital through a series of political-economic processes, 3)
the political mobilization and offensive of the business community, and 4) the failure of
the labor movement to adequately respond to a changing environment. As a new force
driving union decline in the 1980s, the financialization of the U.S. economy may be
included in the second point. Conventional explanations pointing to racism and sexism in
the labor movement, capital flight to RTW states, and the importance of the Reagan
administration are not supported by this analysis. In the case of race, sex, college, and
RTW, the more fundamental problem was failure to organize. Only in the case of college
educated workers is there evidence of union avoidance linked to the failure to organize
during a major reconfiguration of the industrial structure. The main lesson to be drawn
from this analysis is that labor lost power relative to capital due to a series of
interdependent political and economic processes developing both within organizations
and at the national level.
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Conclusion
Contrary to some recent research (Tope and Jacobs 2009; Jacobs and Myers
2014), this paper finds that Ronald Reagan was not the primary driver of union collapse
in the 1980s. Instead, many forces led to the collapse of the labor movement as a
powerful social actor. Union decline is a complex social issue that has occurred beyond
the scope of one explanation or any one presidential administration. Although the
Reagan administration’s NLRB might have been particularly hostile to labor, I have
shown that other social processes played a more influential role and began at earlier
moments in time. Individuals are the product of their historical moment; likewise,
Reagan’s election in 1980 can be viewed, in large part, as a product of the success of the
political mobilization of business in the 1970s13. The business community had
effectively elected a pro-business candidate in their anti-union efforts, but the direct
mobilization against union organizing drives, capital investments away from domestic
production and toward finance, and global production, as well as the competitive
pressures of globalization were more fundamental.
U.S. union decline has been the product of shifts in the relational power between
capital and labor. Changes in the political economic structure afforded capitalists the
opportunity to reclaim power that they had lost since the pre-NLRA era. Simultaneously,
labor unions mostly failed to stake claims on the production process itself, leaving unions
narrowly focused on wages and sapped of the energy gained during the early days of the
Wagner Act. Meanwhile, U.S. labor policy changed very little in the years preceding
13

Unfortunately, I was not able to test the effects of the political mobilization of business in this paper.
Deeper analysis of corporate lobbying, campaign donations, and the organization of corporate interest
groups would be necessary to more thoroughly analyze this part of the story.
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organized labor’s crisis in the 1980s. Employers exploited the chance to take advantage
of this new era. The culmination of all these processes has driven union decline.
A chain of shocks fundamentally transformed the collective bargaining landscape
in the l970s and 1980s. Private-sector union density had already been shrinking by the
1970s, but the rapid spread of global capitalism and a sharp oil crisis gave the business
community an incentive to mobilize. Coming on the heels of racial and gender political
turmoil, the business community exploited the opportunity to use the political backlash
against leftism to change institutional politics. They used their resources to transform
public policy by leading the drive to deregulate both financial and productive constraints,
jolting the bargaining process out of its routinized patterns. Almost four decades later,
organized labor has yet to recover.
Many causes have led to the decline of the American labor movement. When
multiple causes are examined directly and with the use of locally weighted regressions, as
in this paper, temporal dynamics become much clearer, revealing that certain factors are
more or less prominent at certain points in time. For example, the expansion of the U.S.
workforce has led to declines in union density since the 1950s. Declines in total union
membership, however, did not occur until union jobs were destroyed in the late 1970s
and were replaced by jobs in non-unionized industries and regions.
Accelerated union decline was first the result of the restructuring of the United
States domestic economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Commonly termed deindustrialization,
capital flight from unionized to non-unionized geographic areas caused layoffs in many
major industrial centers. Job growth concentrated in Right-to-Work states where unions
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and labor laws were much weaker. Manufacturing jobs left the country on a massive
scale, usually replaced with service-sector work. Computer technology eventually began
to eliminate union membership by the early-2000s, but this phenomenon most likely
varied significantly by industry. As good-paying union jobs became less available,
college education became increasingly necessary to obtain middle-class incomes, perhaps
leading many to seek improved life chances through individual means rather than
collective action. Together, these components of deindustrialization have smashed many
strongholds of industrial unionism, where the labor movement was strongest.
Much of the decline was made possible as policy drift, the delayed effects of the
Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, became more prominent in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
While Taft-Hartley had limited labor tactics and sapped union vitality as part of its
design, the slow drag of the early postwar era became a resurgent force in these later
decades, in many ways preventing unions from defending themselves when employer
behaviors changed. First, unions had lost rank-and-file vitality as leftists were purged
from their organizations, leaving many unprepared for the coming business offensive.
Second, Right-to-Work laws, born of Taft-Hartley, probably mired union organizing.
Third, so long as other structural barriers kept the capital-labor accord in place, unions
did not have to worry as much about restrictions on secondary boycotts, wildcat strikes,
or court injunctions on strike activity. Though organized labor’s hands were
metaphorically tied in 1947, they did fine at the outset. In fact, absolute union
membership continued to grow until 1980. Union bargaining with capital was akin to
playing a game; when the game changed from soccer to baseball sometime around 1980,
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unions suddenly could no longer play the game effectively. In this manner, national labor
law became a hindrance on union activity.
Reacting to changes in the economy and political system, partially of their own
creation, the business community sought to return to the favorable economic conditions
of the early postwar era. Since capitalists could directly respond to increasing global
competition, they targeted the domestic economy – mobilizing against union power (and
state regulation) to mitigate growing uncertainty. Attempting to reclaim managerial
prerogative, a twofold attack on labor unions was initiated. First, business interests
organized to change national economic policy in efforts to reclaim economic surpluses
and workplace control from workers. Second, employers took advantage of economic
changes, oftentimes refusing to negotiate with unions, demanding concessions, and
devoting resources to union prevention tactics. Coupled together, employers took
advantage of favorable economic developments, institutionalizing their agenda within
governmental policy as economic uncertainty swept the country. Organized labor’s base
of power was effectively swept away as employers reasserted dominance in the
workplace. Many union jobs were eliminated as the union strategies of the past failed to
address the new bargaining climate.
Failure to adequately organize was a major part of the failure of unions. Labor is
more likely to win when more union resources are devoted to organizing (Bronfenbrenner
and Juravich 1998). However, wages and absolute union membership rose consistently
until the 1970s. Many labor unions lost sight of the need to constantly maintain union
vitality by supporting the causes of workers everywhere. Clinging to the gains of the
past, many unions were unable to expand their organizing efforts as they struggled for
54

self-preservation in the new economy. Many efforts towards labor movement reform
were too little and may have happened too late.
Evidence in this paper reveals for the first time that the financialization of the
economy may have been partly responsible for labor’s sudden crisis of the 1980s.
Growing influence from both the finance sector and firm-level financial investments
consistently depressed union membership levels. Financial deregulation in the late 1970s
and early 1980s made these two processes drivers of union decline. With increasing
pressures to maximize shareholder value and efforts to reduce uncertainty, firms used
financial mechanisms to undercut the bargaining power of labor unions. Financial sector
growth continued to steadily suppress union growth through 2008. Likely a product of
the shareholder value movement (Fligstein and Shin 2007), the increased reliance of
productive firms on financial investments in the 1980s may have been the primary factor
in ending organized labor’s reign as an influential advocate of working-class interests.
Reducing uncertainty, financial investments could have been used as a conscious antiunion tactic by buffering employers from the threat of labor militancy.
Other recent research has linked the automation of the economy to union decline
(Kristal 2013). While this seems to be the case since the mid-1990s, computer
investment is actually associated with higher levels of union membership in previous
decades in my analyses. Some variation most likely exists by industry, but the net effects
in the extractive and transformative sector are highly positive across the entire period.
While computer investments undoubtedly reduced the need for some kinds of labor, other
jobs were generated and most importantly computer investments are investments in
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production. Unlike divesting from unionized areas or investing in financial speculation,
computer investment is investment in production.
Aside from the substantive findings described above, I advance relational
inequality theory and other theories of organizational power by highlighting the complex
interplay of temporal dynamics on social processes. As I have demonstrated, the success
or failure of competing groups at one point in time rests on the ability of actors to
capitalize on institutional configurations of multiple social processes in previous time
periods. Although the very nature of capitalism lends capital an advantage over labor, the
ability of organized labor to wrest organizational resources from capitalists, or vice versa,
lies in these groups’ abilities to effectively assess and utilize themselves, each other, the
state, and political economic arrangements. Like a chess match, the power of a player in
one particular turn may not determine who wins the game, but it sure helps.
Accepting the overwhelming evidence of the benefits that unions provide to the
economy, civic political participation, and the workplace, I will conclude by prescriptions
for the recovery of the labor movement:
Build stronger union protections into labor policy. Policymakers must equal the
playing field by ensuring workers’ ability to unionize without minimal employer
interference, relaxing restrictions that prevent some workers from unionizing, and
rescinding Taft-Hartley limitations on labor tactics. To ensure continued union strength,
labor would benefit from a higher degree of institutionalization within the government
structure by increasing organized labor’s access to the policy process.
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Labor must use tactics that work in a modern economy. Union decline happened
partly because old practices were no longer effective. Striking and militancy can be
useful, but can also cost workers their jobs if an employer is persuaded to move
production or financialize their investments. With this in mind, labor activists must
strategically analyze their own vulnerabilities and points of leverage to overcome
employer opposition (Juravich 2007).
Labor must expand organizing efforts. This is easier said than done, but a mass
mobilization is necessary if the labor movement is to regain its status as a powerful voice
for the working class. To accomplish this, labor leaders must continue organizing
workers in new industries and occupations. Beyond this, unions must continue building a
more inclusive labor movement, driven by the needs of workers on the shop floor.
None of these recommendations will be easy, as employer interests are
structurally at odds with labor unions, but each serves a necessary role in rebuilding the
power of the U.S. labor movement.
Looking to the future, unionism in the U.S. will continue to struggle. During the
1980s, unions lost much of their ability to influence representative politics, set prevailing
wages, mitigate inequality, and a host of other effects as membership plummeted. This
means that unions must now successfully navigate through an environment where labor
policies are weakened, with employers less affected by traditional union tactics and better
equipped to resist union demands. For unions to succeed and for workers to enjoy their
right to unionize, organized labor must find strategic points at which capital flows can be
blocked or threatened (Harvey 2011). How this is done depends upon the vulnerability of
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corporate images, the perishability of products, types of links in supply chains, the
liquidity of production processes, types of transportation materials, the geographic
specificity of production, etc. Unions have a long struggle ahead, so better understanding
union decline will be of utmost importance in implementing future strategies.
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Non-white Workers/ Workers

Value Added by FIRE / Gross Domestic BEA-NIPA
Product

Union Win Rate (proportion)

Union Certification Elections per - (Total Number of Union Certification NLRB
Elections Held/ Total Employees)
Thousand Employees

Female Workers/ Workers

ULP Claims per Employee
(proportion)

College

Some College
Female Workers
Non-white Workers
Predominance of FIRE

Financialization

Business Offensive

Business Offensive

Union Failure

Job Control

Job Control

Social Exclusion/ Opportunity
Hoarding
Social Exclusion/ Opportunity
Hoarding
Predominance of Finance Sector

Industry-Level Financialization

NLRB
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Financial Assets/ Total Assets

Some College Education/ Workers

College Graduates/ Workers

IRS

IPUMS

IPUMS

IPUMS

IPUMS

1- (Total Number of Recognition
NLRB
Elections Won by Unions/ Total
Number of Representation Elections)

-(Total Number of Unfair Labor
Practice Claims Received Against
Employers / Total Employees)

Computer Investment/Investment in BEA-NIPA
Fixed Assets

Computerization

Skill-Biased Technological Change

Technical Definition
Sources
Union Density* Total Workers
CPS
Proportion of Industry Employment in IPUMS
Right-to-Work States

Variable
Union Members
Right-to-Work State

Variables and Data Sources

Concept Measured
Union Strength
Deindustrialization/ Taft-Hartley

Measures the Financial
Industry's Economic
Influence during the
Shareholder Value Era
Managerial Commitment to
Production

Excluded by local unions

Excluded by local unions

Similar effect as above

Business unionist mentality
reduced level of organizing
as crisis occurred
College premiums increase
over time. Worker
classification in union
elections is also a struggle,
which may be affected be
education.

Measures the Labor
Movement's Success during
Business Offensive

Computer Investment
contains NIPA variables:
Mainframes, PCs, DASDs,
Printers, Terminals, Tape
Drives, Storage Devices,
System Integrators,
Prepackaged Software,
Custom Software, and Own
Account Software
Employer Resistance,
Intimidation, Firings

Measures Shift in Industrial
Structure

Additional Information

APPENDIX A

VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES

APPENDIX B
INDUSTRY MATCHING USED IN ANALYSIS

North American Industry Classification
Standard Industrial Classification, 1970-1997
System, 1998-2008
Mining
Metal mining
Coal mining
Oil and gas extraction
Nonmetallic minerals, except fuels
Electric, gas, and sanitary services

Utilities

Construction

Construction

Food and kindred products

Food, Beverage, and Tobacco manufacturing

Tobacco manufactures
Apparel and other textile products

Apparel, Leather, and other textile products

Leather and leather products
Lumber and wood products

Lumber and wood products
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Paper and allied products

Paper and allied products

Printing and publishing

Printing and publishing

Chemicals and allied products

Chemicals and allied products

Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products

Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products

Petroleum(including integrated) and coal

Petroleum(including integrated) and coal

products

products

Primary metal industries

Primary metal industries

Furniture and fixtures

Furniture & related product

Textile mill products

Textile mill products

Primary metal industries

Primary metal industries

Fabricated metal products

Fabricated metal products

Machinery, except electrical

Machinery, except electrical

Electrical and electronic equipment

Electrical equipment, appliance, and
component manufacturing

Transportation equipment, except motor

Transportation equipment

vehicles
Motor vehicles and equipment
Stone, clay, and glass products
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Computer and electronic product
manufacturing
Nonmetallic mineral product manufacturing
Instruments and related products
Wholesale (Total)

Wholesale (Total)

Retail(Total)

Retail (Total)

Transportation

Air, rail, and water transportation
Truck transportation
Transit and ground passenger transportation
Pipeline transportation
Other transportation & support activities
warehousing and storage

Communication
Broadcasting and telecommunications
Information services and data processing
services
Motion picture and sound recording industries
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Business services
Personal services
Auto repair, miscellaneous repair services
Professional, scientific, and technical services
Administrative and support services
Waste management & remediation services
Health care and social assistance (Total)
Amusement, gambling, and recreation

Amusement and recreation services

industries
Other arts, entertainment, and recreation
Hotels and other lodging places

Accommodation
Food services and drinking places

As displayed in the table for Appendix A, Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
coding for years 1970-1997 were combined with coding from North American Industrial
Classification System (NAICS), years 1998-2008. Since industrial categories are not
entirely congruent across the two classification systems, the combination strategy
involved matching or combining industries when easily accomplished, and leaving
industries separate from one another in cases where the industrial classification of firms
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changed or became more detailed. The table is shaded to indicate which industries
match, are components of each other, or are unique to each classification system across
the two periods. In the data, this produced the effect of some industries spanning the
entire period, while some ended in 1997 and others were began in 1998.
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APPENDIX C
LONG-TERM EFFECTS AND ERROR-CORRECTION RATE PREDICITING
UNION MEMBERSHIP
Table 3. Long-Term Effects and Error Correction Rate
Predicting Declining Union Density, 1970-2008
FIRE

coef/se
FIRE

-21.164***

Union
Organizing
coef/se

Year

coef/se

(0.891)
NLRB Elections

-6.653***
(0.282)

Year

-0.035***
(0.002)

ULPs

-0.355***

-0.254**

(0.083)

(0.089)

(0.086)

Union Losses

-0.694**

0.597*

-2.286***

(0.265)

(0.281)

(0.353)

-1.631***

-1.842***

-1.945***

(0.129)

(0.104)

(0.127)

2.013***

2.248***

2.167***

(0.332)

(0.355)

(0.400)

0.712***

0.534***

0.562***

(0.128)

(0.122)

(0.140)

-1.445***

-1.159***

-1.326***

(0.230)

(0.226)

(0.263)

1.928***

2.224***

1.552***

(0.363)

(0.392)

(0.446)

-0.803*

-0.614

-0.465

(0.327)

(0.337)

(0.424)

-4.283***

-4.222***

-4.083***

(0.265)

(0.250)

(0.292)

Yes

Yes

Yes

0.145

0.144

0.141
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43

43

Productive-Firm Financialization
Domestic Capital Flight
Automation (%)
College Educated (%)
Female Workers (%)
Non-white Workers (%)
Error Correction Rate
Constant
R2
Degrees of Freedom
Observations
BIC

-0.797***

1,226

1,226

1,226

-699.086

-701.507

-525.803

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05
Reported R 2 values do not include error corrections
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APPENDIX D
LONG-TERM EFFECTS AND ERROR-CORRECTION RATE PREDICITING
UNION MEMBERSHIP WITH INTERACTON
Interaction

Long-Term Effect and Error Correction Rate Predicting Declining Union
Membership, 1970-2008
Union
FIRE
Year
Organizing
coef/se
coef/se
coef/se
FIRE

-22.534***
(0.919)

NLRB Elections

-8.510***
(0.314)

Year

-0.040***
(0.002)
-0.436***

-0.152

-0.900***

(0.079)

(0.092)

(0.085)

-0.458*

1.387***

-2.005***

(0.230)

(0.232)

(0.292)

Productive-Firm Financialization

-1.109***

-1.412***

-1.411***

(0.136)

(0.114)

(0.125)

Domestic Capital Flight

8.187***

8.572***

8.531***

(0.579)

(0.570)

(0.639)

-7.042***

-7.124***

-7.037***

(0.399)

(0.394)

(0.422)

Automation (%)

0.741***

0.523***

0.634***

(0.135)

(0.108)

(0.141)

College Educated (%)

-1.835***

-1.499***

-1.586***

(0.242)

(0.233)

(0.263)

1.913***

2.175***

1.571***

(0.324)

(0.338)

(0.387)

Non-white Workers (%)

-1.113***

-0.999**

-0.553

(0.316)

(0.311)

(0.383)

Error Correction Rate

-3.480***

-3.475***

-3.340***

(0.235)

(0.217)

(0.252)

ULPs
Union Losses

Dom. Capital Flight X ET Sector

Female Workers (%)

Constant
R2
Degrees of Freedom
Observations
BIC

Yes

Yes

Yes

(0.126)

(0.173)

(2.924)

0.164

0.161

0.159

43

43

43

1,226

1,226

1,226

-748.356

-782.976

-654.237

Note: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05
Reported R 2 values do not include error corrections
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